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Germany’s Western Front
Translations from the German Official
History of the Great War

Editor’s Note: Germany’s Western Front, edited by Mark Osborne Humphries and John Maker, is a multi-volume
English-language translation of Der Weltkrieg, the German official history of the First World War. Originally produced
between 1925 and 1944 using classified archival records that were destroyed in the aftermath of the Second World War, Der
Weltkrieg is the untold story of German experience on the Western Front. What follows in the foreword, written by Hew
Strachen, to the 1915 volume of the series.

Foreword
by Hew Strachan

W

ar is a reactive business, a
competition whose outcome
is dependent not on some sort of
absolute standard of excellence
on the part of one side, but on the
relative superiority of one side over
another. It is this relationship, the
dynamic between two opponents as
each struggles to impose its will on
the other, that should be at the heart
of operational military history. But
it rarely is. Military history, for all
its massive progress in the last two
or three decades, particularly in the
English speaking world, remains far
too national – and even nationalistic
– in its approach. If the serious
study of military history as a selfcontained subject has a significant
agenda for the future, it is this – to
be comparative.
For no war and no front is this
injunction more important or more
pressing than it is for the First World
War and its western front. The cycle
of reaction and reaction between
two coalitions, remarkably similar
in their military organisations and

in the technologies they employed,
produced a conflict that was not as
static as the immobility of the trenches
which dominated the character of the
fighting suggested. It has now become
axiomatic that “modern war” was
conceived and developed through the
experience of this titanic fight, and
the lessons which it bequeathed. But
the military history on which such
arguments rest continue to be lopsided. English-language historians,
not just Britons but also Americans,
Australians, Canadians and New
Zealanders, have done more than
those writing in French and German
to deepen our understanding of the
conduct of operations on the western
front. However, their research is too
often written from the perspective
of one side only. It pays little or no
attention to the sources available
for the Germans, for what they
tell us about German intentions,
German reactions, or even German
perspectives on British or French
efforts.
The gap is all the more
extraordinary as the German official
history of the war on land, Der
Weltkrieg, is not a rare set of volumes,
at least for the war up to the spring
of 1917, a point it had reached with
volume 12, published in 1939. By
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then the pace of its authors was
quickening: the events of 1914 had
taken six volumes, those of 1915
three (and these are the basis for
this translation), and of 1916 two.
Two more volumes appeared to take
the story to November 1918. Being
completed during the Second World
War, volumes 13 and 14 never gained
a wide circulation. Five hundred
copies of each were reprinted in 1956,
but they did not sell out until 1975.
Such disappointing sales were
themselves indications of two
phenomena. First, the Second World
War had made the study of the First
World War deeply unfashionable
throughout Europe, a trend that
only changed in Britain in 1964,
after the fiftieth anniversary of the
war’s outbreak, and in Germany
not until the ninetieth anniversary
in 2004 – if then. Second, German
military history after 1945, in so far
as it survived at all, stepped away
from the operational focus embraced
by the general staff historians of
the Wilhelmine period and of
which Der Weltkrieg was the final
manifestation. This condition still
pertains: operational military history
does not have the respectability in
German academic circles which it has
now acquired in the English-speaking
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world. The British official history has
been reprinted, the German has not
been, despite the scarcity of volumes
13 and 14.
These two arguments may be
sufficient explanations for the neglect
of the Der Weltkrieg in Germany,
but they do not apply to Englishspeaking historians. Their reasons for
not consulting it more frequently are,
presumably, linguistic. For monoglot
scholars, this translation will be a
boon beyond measure. It has
been fashionable to rubbish the
work of the official historians
of the First World War of all
languages. Sir James Edmonds,
whose labours on behalf of
Britain were not completed
until 1948, and who has been
criticised by David French, Tim
Travers and Denis Winter, to
cite three historians with very
different perspectives, presided
over an enterprise which
may not conform to current
expectations of historians, but
which strove hard for objectivity.
As Andrew Green has shown
in Writing the Great War: Sir
James Edmonds and the Official
Histories 1915-1948 (2003),
this was team writing avant
la lettre. Draft narratives were
compiled from the documents
and were then circulated to the
surviving participants for their
comments in the search for
balance. Edmonds’s creation could
lay much greater claim to unbiased
authority than could – say – Basil
Liddell Hart’s The Real War, probably
the most widely read one-volume
account of the war in the English
language between 1930 and 1964.
Markus Pöhlmann has produced a
study comparable to Green’s on the
writing of Der Weltkrieg, to which
this foreword is heavily indebted.
Kriegsgeschichte und Geschichtspolitik:
der Erste Weltkrieg. Die amtliche
deutsche Militärgeschichtsschreibung
1914-1956 (2002) shows that the
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historians of the Reichsarchiv, the
organisation set up in 1919 to produce
the German official history, were as
thorough in their construction of the
operational story. The first head of
Reichsarchiv’s section for the collection
of documents, Theodor Jochim,
distinguished its work from that of
academic historians, contending that,
“The events of the war, strategy and
tactics can only be considered from a
neutral, purely objective perspective

which weighs things dispassionately
and is independent of any ideology.”
The Nazis’ rise to power in 1933
would test this resolve. Volume 9,
parts of which are included in the
present translation, was published
in 1933, and so was the last to appear
under the old regime. The president
of the Reichsarchiv in that year, Hans
von Haeften, resisted flying the
swastika flag over the office building.
In 1934 the Reichsarchiv, which even
though staffed by former army
officers had thus far remained an
independent body at least in name,

was subordinated to the Wehrmacht.
It is has therefore been easy to
condemn the later volumes of Der
Weltkrieg as ideologically tainted.
But this is both to exaggerate the
effect of the Nazis on the writing of
the history and at the same time to
underplay a pre-existing issue whose
roots date back not to Weimar but to
Wilhelmine Germany.
After 1933, Jochim’s goal
remained the guiding principle
for the historians of the
Wehrmacht as it had been for
those of the Reichsarchiv. Their
careers were formed under
the Hohenzollerns, and their
function within the army, as it
had been for the historians of
the Prussian general staff, was
not only to record but also to
teach. Military history enabled
officers of the future to learn
from the examples of the past;
they would not do so if mistakes
committed by their predecessors
were glossed over. Der Weltkrieg
did not set out specifically to
glorify the German soldier. His
heroism in front-line combat
was the subject of a separate,
more popular series edited by
Georg Soldan. Schlachten des
Weltkrieges covered individual
battles in a run of 36 much
slimmer volumes, the last of
them published in 1930, three
years before Hitler came to
power. What did affect the writing of
Der Weltkrieg was the course of Nazi
foreign policy. The Reichsarchiv had
established working relationships
with the official historians of other
powers, especially Britain. But
contacts with the Soviet Union,
which had provided training areas
for the Reichswehr in the late 1920s,
were broken after 1933, and the
comparative input available for the
earlier volumes began to wither.
During the Second World War itself,
volume 14 – dealing with the events
of 1918 – was censored for fear of
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upsetting Romania (Germany’s ally
in the Second World War, if not in
the First) and Bulgaria (an ally in
both wars). These political pressures
therefore drove the German official
historians even more to a purely
military narrative of events.
This focus on military history
narrowly defined was a product
not of Nazi rule but of a much
older tradition in German military
thought, to be found in the quarter
century before the outbreak of
the First World War in the
famous dispute between Hans
Delbrück, professor of history
in Berlin, and the military
historians of the general staff.
Delbrück argued that Frederick
the Great in the Seven Years
War (1756-1763) had adopted
a strategy of attrition, designed
to wear out the coalition of
France, Austria and Russia
by manoeuvre, whereas the
staff historians said Frederick’s
strategy was one of annihilation,
using manoeuvre to seek battle.
Both were right, because for
each the focus of attention was a
different level of war. Delbrück
was concerned to put war in
its political context; the staff
historians were considering
the operational aspects, the
relationship between strategy
and tactics. So determined were
they that the conduct of war could be
separated from its political objectives
that they could not even see the point
of Delbrück’s argument. Aspects of
the dispute with Delbrück lingered
on after the war, until his death
in 1929. Delbrück was one of ten
academics appointed to the historical
commission to oversee the work of
the Reichsarchiv, the bulk of them
in favour of putting the war in its
political context. They were not
helped when the foreign ministry
refused to cooperate as it wanted
to produce its own story, the better
to rebut the terms of the Versailles
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treaty of 1919. This suited the general
staff historians, who by 1923 had
established virtual control of the
entire project, convinced that they
could produce an adequate history of
the war that was almost exclusively
military in its focus.
Their hopes rested on an illusion:
Der Weltkrieg could not in fact be
apolitical. German officers – like those
of many other armies – were wont to
protest their political neutrality, Hans
von Seeckt, the head of the surrogate

general staff between 1919 and 1926,
providing a case in point. But both
the German army and its chief of
the general staff had too great a
professional role in shaping German
policy for that to be a deliverable
aspiration. Germany had been united
by war and its subsequent history
until 1945 was shaped by it. The
focus on operations carried its own
implications for the formulation of
German strategy between 1870 and
1945: operational excellence came
to be seen as the tool which could
cut through Germany’s problems,
its encircled position in Europe, its

quantitative inferiority in the First
World War, and its “humiliation” at
the peace of Versailles in 1919. The
presumption in the didactic purpose
of Der Weltkrieg was that there was a
perfect solution to the conundrums
of operations, that strategy and
even policy could be subordinated
to the operational level of war, and
that a war conducted as the military
experts thought it should be waged
would produce the right outcome for
Germany.
Erich von Falkenhayn, the
chief of the general staff between
September 1914 and August
1916, and therefore the central
character in this book, became a
prime target for the historians of
the Reichsarchiv. Having served
in China before the First World
War, his career had not been
shaped by Alfred von Schlieffen,
the chief of the general staff
between 1891 and 1905, and the
principal architect of the army’s
approach to the operational
level of war before 1914.
Falkenhayn’s overseas service
had convinced him that Britain’s
maritime and imperial strength
made it the centre of gravity
of the enemy coalition, and
that therefore it should be the
focus of Germany’s war effort.
In the bitter debates between
“easterners” and “westerners”
(to borrow the vocabulary of the
British memoirs of the wars and
apply it to a more apposite context),
Falkenhayn focused on the west
because he realised that ultimately
French and Russian capacity to carry
on fighting rested on British economic
strength. The trouble was that there
was no operational solution to this
strategic conundrum, as Britain’s
forte was naval and Germany’s
military. Joint planning was in
any case a casualty of institutional
division, since Falkenhayn as a
soldier had no leverage over the
navy. The best he could hope for
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was to bring the war to a satisfactory
conclusion before Britain deployed
its “New Armies” to France. Unlike
Schlieffen’s, his solutions were not
primarily operational, but political.
He wanted a separate peace with
Russia to free up the German army
to concentrate in the west. This is
the underlying thread of volumes 7,
8, 9 of Der Weltkrieg, whose sections
relevant to the western front are here
published in English for the first time.
Falkenhayn’s grasp of the
wider strategy imposed on
Germany was not compatible
with his own staff’s focus on
the operational level. Even
his friends, such as Wild von
Hohenborn, who succeeded
him as Prussian minister of war,
were not persuaded. Like the
victors of Tannenberg in 1914,
Paul von Hindenburg and Erich
Ludendorff, they could see the
opportunity for operational
success in the east. Envelopment
battles of the sort so strongly
advocated before the war by
Schlieffen (who was now dead)
could be carried through against
Russia. Hans von Haeften, who
had enjoyed a key role in the
work of the Reichsarchiv since
its inception, was appointed its
president in 1931, and oversaw
the production of volumes 7, 8,
and 9 of Der Weltkrieg. He was
not as unbiased in his views
as the standards demanded by
Jochim suggested he should be.
Heart problems had meant that he
had had to forego active operational
appointments on the general staff
in November 1914. Instead he had
become adjutant to Helmuth von
Moltke the younger, Schlieffen’s
successor and the chief of the general
staff at the outbreak of war. Moltke
became the scapegoat for the defeat
on the Marne in September 1914, and
thereafter stirred the opposition to
Falkenhayn, who had replaced him.
Haeften began work on a history
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of the eastern front even while the
events described in this volume were
unfolding. Shuttling back and forth
to the east, visiting the headquarters
of Hindenburg and Ludendorff,
he became such a fierce critic of
Falkenhayn that he was nearly courtmartialled.
The operational perspective
of the official historians therefore
provided the ammunition with
which Der Weltkrieg attacked
Falkenhayn. Holger Afflerbach’s

General Erich von Falkenhayn, the Chief
of the General Staff of the Field Army
and head of the OHL.

political biography, Falkenhayn.
Politisches Denken und Handeln im
Kaiserreich (1994), provides important
correctives. Falkenhayn’s operational
efforts need to be set in their political
context. They were accompanied
by a sustained attempt to prise the
Entente apart, but his efforts to
persuade Russia to negotiate were
incompatible with the predilections
of either Germany’s principal ally,
Austria-Hungary, or of Hindenburg
and Ludendorff. For them, the

weight applied to Russia in 1915
should be directly military, not
diplomatic. Hindenburg’s iconic role
as a national hero created a political
leverage which ultimately neither the
chancellor, Theodor von Bethmann
Hollweg, nor the Kaiser could resist.
It has been argued that Der
Weltkrieg was written to glorify
Hindenburg and (especially)
Ludendorff, just as it has been said
(wrongly, as Andrew Green shows)
that Edmonds used the British official
history to defend Douglas
Haig. In 1917-18, Haeften had
worked on propaganda in the
German supreme command,
Oberste Heeresleitung III. But
after the war Hindenburg
and Ludendorff kept their
distance from the work of the
Reichsarchiv, and Der Weltkrieg
barely mentioned Hindenburg
in its account of the events of
1918. Wolfgang Foerster, who
succeeded Haeften in 1934 as
the director of what was now
called the Forschungsanstalt für
Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte,
was better disposed towards
Ludendorff. He treated the
victory at Tannenberg, whose
site was both a focus for the
commemoration of the First
World War and a memorial to
Hindenburg after his death, as
a “model battle,” on a par with
the great German victories of
Leipzig in 1813 and Sedan in
1870. But the lesson from all three
cases was that the use of envelopment
as an operational method had led
to a decisive victory. So the real
influence on Foerster was not so
much Ludendorff as Schlieffen. In
1921, he had published Graf Schlieffen
und der Weltkrieg, a book designed
to show how Schlieffen’s legacy
had shaped Germany’s conduct
of the war. The combination of
Ludendorff’s right-wing radicalism
and mental instability increasingly
alienated him from his former
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colleagues on the general staff in
general and from the Reichsarchiv in
particular. The authors employed
on Der Weltkrieg never subjected
Hindenburg and Ludendorff to the
sort of psychological profiling that
they accorded to their predecessors,
Moltke and Falkenhayn, but in 1952
Foerster published an independent
study of Ludendorff’s
“psychological state in the
final stages of the First World
War,” Der Feldherr Ludendorff im
Unglück, in 1952.
Most of the papers which
went into the writing of Der
Weltkrieg were destroyed when
the Royal Air Force bombed
the depository in which the
Prussian military archives
were stored in 1945. This is
the single most compelling
reason for according the utmost
seriousness to this book. Unlike
the official histories of the other
major belligerents of the First
World War, that of Germany
can never be written again, or
at least not from a comparable
primary source base. However,
the military papers of the other
states of imperial Germany
have survived, and so too have
collections of private papers
belonging to those involved
in the writing of Der Weltkrieg.
Most importantly the papers
which were still the subject
of active investigation by the
official historians were kept
elsewhere and so not destroyed
in 1945. Having been stored in
Potsdam in the Cold War, they
have now been united with the
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military archives in Freiburg. From
these it is clear that many facets of
Germany’s war effort other than
the operational level of its conduct
interested the Reichsarchiv and its
successors. Although the volumes of
Der Weltkrieg are Eurocentric, theatres
outside Europe were covered briefly
and were due to be the subject of

German soldiers with a rudimentary gas
mask, circa 1915.

individual studies. Ludwig Boell’s
monumental history of the East
African campaign, completed in
1944, was effectively recreated by
its author after the war, and then
privately published. Most weighty
were the projected volumes of the
economic history of the war, of which
only the first, pre-war volumes, ever
appeared.
Mark Humphries, John
Maker and their team of
translators, Wilhlem J.
Kiesselbach, Peter Meinlschmidt
and Ralph Whitehead, are to
be congratulated on a major
achievement. The year 1915
marked the moment when the
fighting on the western front
adapted to trench warfare,
and when the armies of all
sides began what recent
British military historians have
described as a “learning curve.”
This process was of course not
a uniquely British phenomenon,
but one in which Germans
and French also shared, and to
whose development the battles
at Soissons and Neuve Chapelle,
the gas attack at Ypres, and
the offensives in Champagne
and Artois all contributed.
This volume will transform
English-speaking historians’
understandings of a crucial
stage in the First World War. It
might even make Germans take
their own operational military
history seriously.
Hew Strachan is the Chichele
Professor of the History of War,
University of Oxford.
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